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Foreword: Family Restructuring at the End of
the Twentieth Century-Issues for a New
Century
Lynn D. Wardle*
This issue of the B. Y. U. Journal of Public Law publishes a
selection of the papers presented at the 1993 North American
Regional Conference on Family Restructuring at the End of the
Twentieth Century, convened by the International Society of
Family Law (ISFL). The conference was held at Jackson Lake
Lodge in the Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming, June 1012, 1993.
As the chair of that conference, I have been invited to
write an introduction to this issue. I do so in four parts. First, I
describe the three-day regional conference. Second, I
summarize the conference papers that have been selected for
publication in this issue. Third, immediately after each
abstract, I briefly comment on each paper, suggesting lines of
further discussion and inquiry. (The purpose of such comments
is not to criticize the articles, for each of them is excellent, but
to expand consideration of the problems and analysis
presented. In the familiar tradition of American legal
education, I attempt to engage in a kind of Socratic dialogue to
refine and enhance serious consideration of important subjects.)
I also review and comment on four student pieces relating to
family law that are published in this issue. I conclude with
some reflective observations about the themes which emerged
from these papers and the conference presentations that
suggest the issues of family law and policy that will be of
prevalent concern as the Twenty-first Century opens.
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THE 1993 NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF
THE ISFL

The ISFV is well-known for its superb, scholarly world
conference, held approximately every three years in different
locations around the world. 2 Those week-long gatherings
attract hundreds of scholars in family law and other related
disciplines from around the world. The multitude of different
cultures, legal systems, and academic disciplines represented
provides immensely valuable opportunities for formal and
informal comparative discussions. Selected papers presented at
such conferences have been published and are valuable
reference sources. 3 Because of the success of the world
conferences, and the length of time between them, regional
conferences have been convened in Mrica, Asia, and Western
Europe. Yet the ISFL had never sponsored a regional gathering
of family law scholars in North America before 1993.
The members of the ISFL Executive Council from North
America thought that a conference designed specifically for
American and Canadian family law scholars would be
extremely beneficial. 4 I was selected Chairman of the
Conference and, with excellent support from the ISFL and

1 The ISFL is an organization with more than 350 members in more than
50 countries.
2 The next (8th) world conference planned by the ISFL, dealing with the
topic of Families Across Frontiers, will be held June 28-July 2, 1994 in Cardiff,
Wales. For more information, contact Professor Nigel Lowe, 1994 ISFL Conference,
Cardiff Law School, P.O. Box 427, Cardiff CF1 lXD, Wales, U.K.
3 See, e.g., MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES:
AREAS OF LEGAL, SOCIAL AND ETHICAL CHANGE: AN INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds., 1980); AN
AGING WORLD, DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (John M.
Eekelaar & David Pearl eds., 1989); PARENTHOOD IN MoDERN SOCIETY: LEGAL AND
SOCIAL ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (John Eekelaar & Petar Sarcevic
eds., 1993).
4 Professor Sanford Katz of Boston College Law School, Professor Don
MacDougall of the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, Professor Margo
Melli of the University of Wisconsin Law School, and I, are members of the
Executive Council of the ISFL, and together we functioned as the planning
committee for the North America Regional Conference.
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many of its distinguished members, 5 we began planning a
regional conference in the summer of 1991. 6
The culmination of the planning was the Jackson Lake
Conference on Family Restructuring at the End of the
Twentieth Century, attended by nearly a hundred family law
professors, and a sprinkling of lawyers, scholars, and
professionals in related disciplines including psychology,
psychiatry, social work, and family studies. Most of the
participants were from the United States (about 84 registrants)
and Canada (about 12 registrants). However, other registrants
came from as far away as Japan, Sweden, and Denmark.
During the three-day conference, seventeen sessions
(usually two or three sessions ran simultaneously) were
conducted involving more than fifty scholarly presentations.
Additionally, a general welcoming session, opening dinner, and
conference luncheon provided opportunities for all participants
to come together. Professor Anders Agell of the University of
Uppsala, Sweden, President of the ISFL spoke at the luncheon.
He drew on his extensive comparative and international
experience to contrast legal policy, technique, and thinking
concerning family law in civil and common law jurisdictions.
The presenters were invited (though not required) to
submit their papers for publication consideration.
Approximately one-third did so, and from those papers, the
articles included in this issue of the B. Y. U. Journal of Public
Law were selected. Other papers were submitted to the
International Journal of Law and the Family, published at
Oxford University, some of which have been selected for
publication there. The papers published here provide an
excellent and representative sampling of the quality and scope
of the conference presentations.

5 In addition to the aforementioned members of the Executive Council,
many family law scholars assisted with the planning and selection of the program.
Space does not permit mentioning all of them, but Professor Carol Bruch, Professor
Frances Olsen, Professor Harry Krause and Professor Carl Schneider were
particularly generous with their time and suggestions.
6 The key individual in the administration of the Conference was Lisa
Stamps Jones, a law student at the B.Y.U. Law School who is simultaneously
pursuing a graduate degree in educational administration. With her excellent
administrative talents and her enthusiasm for planning and management (and with
the gracious and cheerful support at the conference of her husband, Steve) the
conference was a successful and memorable event.
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AND DISCUSSION OF THE PAPERS

Margaret Mahoney's contribution, A Legal Definition of
the Stepfamily: The Example of Incest Regulation directly
addresses the most prominent manifestation of "families in
transition." Professor Mahoney, a leading contemporary
authority on the law of stepfamilies in the United States, 7
notes that the traditional emphasis on the nuclear family
prevents many persons who reside in other types of
stepfamilies from enjoying the same type of recognition for
their relationships. As stepfamilies account for nearly thirty
percent of all married couple households with children in
America, Professor Mahoney urges legal recognition of the
parental rights and responsibilities of those relations. Since
more than ninety percent of all stepparents are men, the issue
of incest among steprelations is not insignificant. Yet in about
one-third of all states, incest laws do not extend to
steprelatives, and the prohibitions in other states vary
profoundly. Relevant laws include both civil marriage
prohibitions and criminal incest proscriptions. The Tennessee
Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes v. McAfee, 8 is faulted for
not recognizing the long-term purported marriage of a
stepdaughter to her stepfather for purposes of awarding the
woman surviving spouse rights. Professor Mahoney calls for a
comprehensive legal definition of stepfamily for the next
century, as well as a sensitive policy analysis of how family
laws should relate to steprelatives.
The hybrid nature of step-relations certainly creates very
thomy problems. Vacillation, if not inconsistency, seems
inevitable. For example, criticizing the lack of uniform and
equal treatment of stepfamilies and biological-nuclear families
is not entirely consistent with applauding exceptions to the
general application of family laws to stepfamilies. Likewise,
criticism of the Tennessee Supreme Court decision in Rhodes, 9
for not recognizing (for purposes of surviving spouse rights) the

7 See, e.g., Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the
Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38 (1984); Margaret M.
Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Federal Law, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (1987);
Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills,
22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917 (1989).
8 457 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1970).
9 ld.
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marriage of a stepdaughter-stepfather reflects the ambivalence
that has thwarted the development of the law regarding
stepparent incest and marriage affinity prohibitions, and
created the patchwork of inconsistencies that Professor
Mahoney justly decries. Professor Mahoney's thorough research
and multi-faceted analysis elucidates well the need for a
comprehensive, systematic legal reform to harmonize the laws
pertaining to stepfamily incest and marriage restrictions.
Laurence C. Nolan's Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother:
But Court-Ordered Grandparent Visitation in the Intact
Family? criticizes the trend to statutorily authorize courtordered grandparent visitation over the objection of natural
parents in intact families. Originally, grandparent visitation
statutes applied only after the breakup of a family to prevent a
vindictive custodial parent from terminating contact between
the children of the divorce and the parents of the noncustodial
spouse. The second generation of grandparent visitation
statutes, however, allows courts to order parents in intact
families to permit their parents (the grandparents) to visit
their children (the grandchildren).
Professor Nolan notes that grandparents' claims to
visitation do not meet the constitutional test for fundamental
rights" The policy underpinnings of the principle of family
autonomy are carefully considered, and the value of state noninterference are explained in terms of diversity, natural law,
and practicality. The conflicting interests of grandparents,
grandchildren, and the state are identified. Professor Nolan
recommends the traditional standard for intervention in
custody contests between parents and non-relatives: showing
harm to the child from denial of visitation, and showing that
visitation is in the best interests of the child (BIC). The BIC
standard alone is not appropriate because grandparent
interests do not cancel out parental interests like the interests
of competing parents do. Grandparents have an appropriate
avenue of access to grandchildren in intact families through
their own children who are the grandchildren's parents, so
state-ordered grandparent visitation in the absence of death,
divorce, or separation, is unjustified. Equating grandparent
visitation to noncustodial parent visitation is inapt. The stress
of litigation and disruption of the forced visitation is
detrimental to grandchildren, since sociological studies show
that the most significant factor shaping the influence of
grandparents on grandchildren is the grandparent's

6
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relationship with the parent of the grandchildren. The
importance of intact families for the proper development of
children exceeds the importance of grandparent contact,
especially when the latter comes at the cost of damaging the
former. The fundamental constitutional right of parents to rear
their children includes the right to determine who may visit
with their children. A compelling justification to infringe this
constitutional right exists when harm to the child can be
shown, not merely when a child may be better off with
grandparent visitation. Courts that look only for what is best
for the child typically overlook the detrimental effects on the
child of a court making such decisions.
Professor Nolan makes a strong case for the need of
greater protection to safeguard nuclear family relations from
unwanted grandparent interference than the simple BIC
standard provides. Her recommended two-step standard
requiring first a showing of harm, might be reduced to one
step; if the grandchild is harmed from denial of visitation, then
it may be presumed that grandparent visitation is in the best
interests of the child. But some might argue that denial of an
association that is ''best" for a child is "harmful" to the child
(compared to the achievable result). "Harm," like "best
interests" is a pliable concept. Ultimately, the issue tums on
some very practical questions: What is the standard of proof?
How much harm must be proven to support a legal finding of
harm? Likewise, resort to the doctrine of family autonomy
requires consideration of the dysfunctional family-not divorced
or separated, but not functioning as a real family in any
meaningful way. Professor Nolan's thorough analytical
dissection of the arguments for grandparent visitation with
children in intact nuclear families is very impressive, and
grounded in realism.
Phyllis Bookspan's From a Tender Years Presumption to a
Primary Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really
Changed? . .. Should It? begins by reviewing the evolution of
legal presumptions regarding child custody upon divorce. Then
she argues that private decision-making about custody should
be preferred, because parents, not judges or other professionals,
know what is best for their children, and most families are able
to make appropriate custody decisions without state
intervention. Professor Bookspan suggests that a clear
"determinative" legal rule should be adopted. She asserts that a
"bright line" standard which tells the parties what result the
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court is likely to reach if they do not privately settle the
matter, encourages private ordering. Highly discretionary
standards, such as "best interests of the child," and idealistic
standards, like 'joint custody," are criticized as being
impractical, unrealistic, and encouraging unnecessary
litigation. The "primary caretaker" presumption is the best
determinative standard because it is the most realistic,
reflecting actual nurturing patterns and reasonable parental
expectations. If it is gender-biased, that merely reflects the
reality that substantially more mothers than fathers make the
effort and devote the time to be the principal nurturer of their
children. However, if the law too inflexibly adopts any
definition of custody (such as "primary caretaker"), it will give
the custodian absolute or near-absolute control. The preferredparty then has no incentive to bargain to let the other parent
have any custodial responsibility. Thus, reasonable contact
with the noncustodial secondary caretaker should be expected.
Professor Bookspan's analysis has the persuasive appeal of
common sense. The problem, as she recognizes, is the
uncertainty of vague rules regarding custody. Her arguments
for a "determinative" custody rule are quite reasonable. The
call for mandatory reasonableness in bargaining over visitation,
however, seems to let the cat of uncertainty slip back in
through an open window. Even a bright-line "determinative"
rule regarding who gets custody will not solve the problem of
uncertainty if the definition of "custody" is vague. Thus, a
determinative rule for custody (like primary caretaker) should
be complemented by a determinative rule regarding what
custody entails, and a determinative definition of visitation
rights. It is worth noting that there is a growing trend among
both legislators 10 and commentators 11 to provide minimum or
default visitation schedules or time periods, applicable in case
the parties are unable to reach agreement between themselves
as to what amount or routine of visitation is best for the
children. However, if we combine a determinative rule
regarding custody with a determinative rule defining visitation
rights, have we not effectively undermined the prospects for
parents to privately determine custody arrangements for their

10 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-32 to -37 (Supp. 1993).
11 See generally THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, PREL. DRAFT No. 3, § 7.15
(1992).
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children, which is the primary value the determinative rules
seek to achieve? Professor Bookspan's rigorous analysis is an
excellent step toward grappling with these tough issues.
Allen M. Parkman, a Professor of Management, gives an
economic analysis of the costs and consequences of the no-fault
divorce revolution in Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the
Marriage Contract. Negotiated termination of marriage under
traditional divorce-for-fault grounds has been replaced by
unilateral termination of marriage-at-will under no-fault laws,
resulting in detrimental financial and quality-of-life
consequences for divorced women and their children. In
contract terms, marriage has changed from a contract for the
joint lives of the parties with specific performance the remedy
for breach, to a contract terminable at will, subject to
liquidated damages prescribed by statute. Because women
usually significantly alter their circumstances by familyenhancing specialization, the change in marriage contract law
leaves them particularly vulnerable. Marriage is a contract,
and a fundamental function of contract law is to encourage
long-term investments and to discourage opportunistic
behavior. Contract remedies provide incentives for parties to
make decisions that produce social benefits. The loss
experienced by the spouse who has specialized in familyenhancing skills is underestimated upon divorce. Employment
and education for married women may not provide benefits to
the family as much as it provides insurance for the married
woman in case of divorce. Children in a divorce bear a heavy
cost that goes uncompensated in the divorce damage
calculation. The cost could be avoided in some cases if the law
gave parents greater incentive to make marriage work.
Professor Parkman proposes that a Marriage Code similar to
the Uniform Commercial Code be drafted to encourage
marriage duration for the joint lives of the parties, and with
specific performance as the preferred remedy for breach of the
marriage agreement. No-fault divorce should be permitted only
when divorce costs are low, as when the divorce occurs early in
marriage or before children are born.
Professor Parkman's contract analysis cuts to the heart of
the dilemma of no-fault divorce. No-fault has reduced the
marriage contract from one of significant legal commitment and
reciprocal reliability to one of individual convenience and
instability. Some scholars call post-no-fault marriage contracts

1]

FOREWORD

9

"illusory." 12 The focus on remedies is understandable as
economic analysis must operate on quantifiable factors. The
problem with economic analysis, as Professor Parkman hints, is
the difficulty of accurately quantifying intangible family values,
including "human capital" of family-skill specialization.
Likewise, the social and personal value of intact families, of
family continuity, and of full-time or significant nurturing of
children by a parent may not be recognized by purely economic
analysis any more than these intangibles are recognized in
current "rights" analysis. For instance, economic analysis may
recognize the potential financial benefit to individuals and their
families when a married person substantially abandons
caretaking responsibilities to pursue a lucrative but demanding
career that leaves inadequate time and emotional resources for
family responsibilities, but can it measure the potential
intangible costs to the individual, the spouse, the children, the
marriage, the parent-child relationships, the quality of family
life, or to society (in terms of lost self-esteem, drug, sex and
delinquency problems, etc.) of that step? Can it quantify the
real cost of infidelity by a married man or woman-to self,
spouse, children, marriage, or family? Economic analysis tends
to undervalue and devalue non-economic goods, qualities, and
conditions. Thus, drafting a Marriage Code modelled after the
Uniform Commercial Code may perpetuate the devaluation of
many intangible qualities that make marriage and family
meaningful and desirable. Professor Parkman's excellent article
invites us to examine these issues, and challenges us to take
the contract dimension of marriage more seriously.
Professor Cynthia Stames article, Stories of Dissociation
and Buyout: Applications of a Contemporary Partnership Model
for Divorce, also provides an economic-oriented analysis of
divorce, comparing modern divorce to dissociation from a
partnership. 13 Modem marriage ideology, the "egalitarian

12 See, e.g., June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage:
Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TuL. L. REV. 953, 979
n.l15 (1991); see also Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in
Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 867-870, 882-898 (1988); William J.
Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental Rights:
The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 58-80 (1990).
13 Professor Starnes' article elaborates on and refines an earlier publication.
See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 67 (199.'3).
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relationship," retains the entity concept ("one flesh") of the
common law. But most marriages are not equal; the
responsibilities of family "caretaking'' still are assumed largely
by (and sometimes requiring full-time commitment of) women.
As a result, the income-earning ability of married women
suffers significantly. Borrowing from partnership dissociation,
where the enterprise continues after a partner drops out,
Professor Starnes proposes a "buyout" approach to achieve
more equitable economic distribution upon the dissolution of
marriage. Examples from traditional, hybrid, and egalitarian
marriages are considered, and special exceptions to the buyout
rule, which benefit the high-achieving caretaker and the
childless caretaker who might get relatively little under a pure
partnership buyout model, are suggested.
Professor Starnes impressively unmasks the equality myth,
i.e., the denial and devaluation of the real costs of "caretaking"
services that are typically provided by married women for the
benefit of their families. Her incisive discussion of the hidden
costs of caretaking forces one to question other hidden aspects
of the marriage partnership, such as the denial and
devaluation of the real worth and value of these "caretaking"
services. The partnership buyout analogy is helpful, but may be
of limited practical value. In an era of late-marriage (or
remarriage) patterns, as well as dual-income, diminishedcaretaking marriage patterns, one wonders whether buyout
would provide significant protection to increasing numbers of
women whose real investment in their husband's incomeproducing enterprise may be demonstrably diminishing.
Moreover, partnership dissociation and buyout are appropriate
models only if the partnership enterprise continues despite one
partner leaving it. Some fundamental assumptions of the
application of partnership buyout to marriage termination may
need to be examined. The justification for treating a marriage
that ends in divorce as an "enterprise that continues," or of
assuming that all "income-generating activity of the marriage"
is the real "marital enterprise," or of computing the real value
of the marital enterprise without considering how much the
sole (or greater) income earner would be earning if she had not
gotten married, or of requiring buyout payments to continue
long into the future, in perpetuity (less like dissociation than
silent partner or shareholder participation) is not self-evident.
While questions such as these must be addressed, Professor
Starnes excellent paper has convincingly shown that the

FOREWORD
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partnership model is a promising legal analogy. Intuitively
modem marriage is widely felt to be and experienced as a
partnership or shared endeavor. 14
In Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law,
Professor Jane C. Murphy addresses the neglected practical
problem of the delivery of legal services to the low- and
moderate-income population. Family law services are the most
frequently-requested type of legal assistance (thirty-two
percent) sought by indigent persons in the United States, yet
between one-half and four-fifths of those requests are not met.
Almost one-half of all litigants in domestic cases are
unrepresented; including ninety-three percent of defendants in
child support cases. A realistic case study illustrates the severe
practical dilemmas a middle-income family experiences
regarding access to legal services upon divorce. As a significant
increase in public funding for family law services is unlikely,
Professor Murphy recommends adopting substantive rules
(such as the primary caretaker rule in custody disputes) that
make it easier for unrepresented parties to obtain fair legal
consideration. She also recommends improving the procedures
and structures (no hearings, summary proceedings, use of
nonlawyer aides, increasing pro se programs) to fairly
accommodate the situation of unrepresented parties.
Professor Murphy offers a viewpoint of great potential
value to the legal profession. Such mundane matters as court
procedures, forms, filing regulations, location of tribunals, and
method of proceeding may do more to provide or prevent justice
than grand theoretical doctrines and impressive substantive
reforms. Professor Murphy's article precipitates reconsideration
of some basic issues. One might begin by noting that the
financial barriers to legal services for low- and middle-income
Americans affect all kinds of legal problems, not just family
law problems. Why should family law be given priority or
preference in facilitating access to the courts? Is it because
family law problems are the type of problems for which our
legal system functions best? Is it because parties who take
family law problems to court are best satisfied with the results,
and come away with the best impression of the value of our
legal system? Is it because there are no other, certainly no
better, places to obtain relief for family problems than lawyers

14 See infra pp. 15-16.
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and courts, and no better solution for family problems than
legal solutions? Will life in the United States really be better if
we double or quadruple the amount of family litigation by
indigent and moderate-income parties? Will their lives really be
appreciably enhanced? Finally, one wonders whether the
problems identified are limited to and the reforms suggested
should be limited to low-income families, or whether the nature
of family law disputes. does not suggest that they should be
significantly de-formalized, if not de-legalized, regardless of the
income of the parties. Professor Murphy's revealing empirical
studies and realistic perspectives not only underscore the need
for practical reforms, but raise some important questions about
the epidemic of legalization of family relations.
In Legal Policy, Technique and Research in Family Law:
Some Comparative Aspects, Professor Anders Agell of the
University of Uppsala, Sweden and President of the ISFL,
contrasts the open, fairness-seeking objectives of the common
law countries with the regulated, foreseeability-protecting
objectives of civil law countries. He notes that differences in
legal scholarship between American and civil law countries
particularly reflect these technical differences. Coherence in
legal policy is Professor Agell's preferred approach to
comparative legal studies, and examples concerning the role of
contract in family law, treatment of professional degrees,
relationship between property division and alimony, and
treatment of common law marriage and non-marital
cohabitation are described. Professor Agell concludes by noting
the value of comparative law for enhancing understanding of
one's own national law.
Comparative family law insights may be very revealing, as
Professor Agell's irrefutable observations about the discretionprotecting preference of common law jurisdictions and the
predictability-protecting approach of civil law jurisdictions
demonstrate. His emphasis on finding "coherence" in
comparative legal studies reminds us that husbands and wives,
parents and children are fundamentally alike in significant
ways, regardless of where they live or the cultures from which
they come. It could be added that differences and divergences
in the family policies, techniques and scholarship of different
countries are very revealing, too. In the laboratories of different
legal systems different approaches function as social
experiments that permit skilled comparative family law
researchers to discern the advantages and disadvantages of

FOREWORD
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various potential solutions to ubiquitous problems of family law
and social policy.
Ill.

BRIEF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF STUDENT
CONTRIBUTIONS

In addition to papers presented at the Jackson Lake
Lodge conference, this issue of the B.Y.U. Journal of Public
Law contains four students pieces addressing family-lawrelated issues. In the Best Interest: The Adoption of F.H., An
Indian Child by Ivy N. Voss, examines the dilemma of the
adoption of Indian children by non-Indian adoptive parents
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The case of In re
Adoption of F.H./ 5 launches the study. F.H. was bom with
symptoms of Fetal Alcohol Effects to a native Alaskan woman
and an unknown man. She was in foster homes from birth,
reared from age four-months by the Hartleys, who adopted her
when she was two years old. Shortly thereafter they had to
move from Alaska to Washington. Her mother voluntarily
relinquished her parental rights so that the Hartleys could
adopt F.H. The mother's native American village of Noatak
opposed the adoption and proposed placement with a member
of the extended family, but the trial court and Alaska Supreme
Court found "good cause" for circumventing the ICWA statutory
preferences for extended family and tribal placement. Ms. Voss
gives a sympathetic review of the policy and purposes of the
ICWA and summarizes some dilemmas of interpretation,
including the definition of "Indian Child," tribal rights,
exclusive tribal court jurisdiction, and placement preferences
under the ICWA. Constitutional issues ranging from violation
of state authority to regulate domestic relations to racial
discrimination have not been entirely resolved. The Alaska
Supreme Court interpretation of the ICWA, making the best
interest of the child a "good cause" consideration, is lauded.
The ICWA addresses one of the most fascinating and
difficult issues in family law-the role of racial or cultural
identity in custody or adoption placement decisions. The
inconsistencies created in the effort of lawmakers and judges to
balance competing considerations are apparent in both the
ICWA and Ms. Voss' analysis of them. If the typical modern
American view of what is ''best" for an Indian child is so

15 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993).
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different from what the typical (or a specific) Indian tribe or
culture thinks is best for the child (on the basis of fundamental
cultural disagreements on value questions for which there are
no absolute rational standards), one wonders how asking
typical American judges to apply the "best interest of the child"
standard will help resolve the dilemma. On the other hand, one
wonders about the rationality of giving tribes a veto power over
an adoption decision made by Indian parents for the benefit of
a child, when that decision is endorsed by independent social
workers, and reviewed and approved by an impartial judge.
Clearly a tribe is a political unit with a direct political interest
in enhancing its political base and its legal power, regardless of
the welfare of children. The power given the tribe seems
directly inconsistent with the values underlying the Supreme
Court's constitutional view of the relations of family, state and
child. 16 Consideration of the policy foundations of the ICWA is
certainly timely.
Billye D. Baird examines one of the provocative issues of
biomedical ethics and family law in Fetal Tissue Transplants as
Treatment for Parkinsonian Patients: A Miracle Cure or Science
Fiction Nightmare. Mter describing the etiology of Parkinson's
Disease, Ms. Baird reviews the complicated political history of
the moratorium on federally-funded research involving fetal
tissue taken by induced abortion. The arguments for and
against the moratorium are capably summarized and
compared, and some internal inconsistencies in positions on
both sides are noted. The political denouement of the
controversy-President Clinton's executive order and approval
of congressional legislation-are described. Ms. Baird concludes
that the moral concerns about fetal tissue transplants
encouraging abortion are significant and override the
arguments for medical need and benefit which are very
tenuous.
The debate over the use of fetal tissue for medical research
is a fascinating controversy in which political concerns seemed
to dominate and rational analysis seemed to disappear. The
argument that many women will be persuaded to have
abortions they otherwise would not have is empirically
unsupported and seems questionable. Roe v. Wade, 17 long ago,
made abortion a matter of private choice, and surveys of the
16 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-402 (1923).
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

1]

FOREWORD

15

reasons why women have abortions consistently show that
most women get abortions for personal or social, not
therapeutic, reasons. 18 In an age when mere personal
preference is deemed an acceptable reason for most of the 1.5
million elective abortions annually, 19 the argument that a
significant number of women will be persuaded to have an
abortion because some person might receive some medical
benefit as a result of the abortion may be strained. This review
of the ethical considerations involved in the fetal tissue debate
clarifies many of the serious dimensions of an issue that seems
to have been trivialized by politicization.
In Losing Sticks from the Bundle: The Incompatibility of
Tenancy by the Entireties with Life and Legislation in the Late
Twentieth Century, Barbara Sharp examines the protection for
an innocent spouse when a forfeiture claim under the
comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
is made against property held as tenancy by the entireties.
United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue,20 is the focus of the
analysis. In that case the federal government sought forfeiture
of the real property (site of a pharmacy) that was the locus of
the illegal drug sales. The property was owned as a tenancy by
the entireties by the convicted drug dealer and his wife. The
district court dismissed the forfeiture complaint on the ground
that such a tenancy cannot be severed by illegal activities. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded,
holding that the innocent wife of the drug dealer should have a
life estate that would ripen into fee simple title should her
husband predecease her. Ms. Sharp reviews the numerous

18 Aida Torres & Jacqueline D. Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 170 (1988) (a 1987 survey of 1900 women who had sought
abortions reported the following motivations: rape or incest, 1%; personal health
problems, 7%; possible fetus health problems, 13% (although only 8% actually
sought medical advice); problems with relationship or desire to avoid parenthood,
51%; presently unable to afford a baby, 68%; concern about how baby would
change life, 76%); Geraldine Faria, Ph.d. et a!., Women and Abortion: Attitudes,
Social Networks, Decision-Making, 11 Soc. WORK HEALTH CARE 85, 90-92 (1985) (of
517 women seeking abortion the following reasons were given: rape, 0.8%; fear of
pregnancy, 1.2%; physical problems, 6%; no partner, 15.3%; financial problems,
25.9%; lack of parental readiness, 33.5%). Utah statistics on the reasons for
abortion from 1978-1990 reveal that over 98% of all abortions are performed for
reasons of private choice or convenience (not rape, incest, fetal deformity, or
maternal health). UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, INDUCED ABORTIONS IN UTAH
(1978-1990 eds.).
19 !d.
20 949 F.2d 73 (3rd Cir. 1991).
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authorities supporting the position taken by the district court,
notes that the district court decision was consistent with state
law principles that forbid a creditor or bankruptcy proceeding
to disturb the tenancy by the entireties, and criticizes the
Court of Appeals for creating a "new estate" less valuable to
Mrs. Bernstein. Finally, calling for abolition of this type of
property estate, Ms. Sharp criticizes the fictional unity of
husband and wife that underlies tenancy by the entireties
because it is outmoded, and it interferes with bankruptcy,
creditors remedies, and drug foreclosures.
Certainly most modern marriages do not reflect the belief
that husband and wife are of one mind in all things. But
mutuality is required in many important matters of marriage,
including, for example, sexual relations, adoption, etc. Even in
mundane financial matters, at the practical level, many
marriages function on the basis of mutual agreement (e.g.,
where they will move to find or take employment, whether they
will purchase a four-door sedan or two-door sports car, whether
to buy a hide-a-bed or simple sofa, what color to paint the
hallway, etc.). Criticism of tenancy by the entireties because
the entity concept of marriage is outmoded in modern marriage
ignores the fact that tenancy by the entireties is voluntarily
chosen by many married couples. That raises at least the
possibility that when it comes to home ownership-the most
valuable (often the only significant) asset many married
couples have-the concept of a unified marital entity is actually
appealing to some modern married couples who want such a
major investment to be possessed and controlled on a joint-andmutual basis, with right of survivorship in the spouse. The fact
that merchants, bankruptcy creditors, and police agencies may
be somewhat hampered in their efforts to dispossess married
couples from their homes seems hardly a compelling reason to
abolish an estate that has protected the financial and lodging
security of married couples and families for centuries. This
paper raises good questions about real property estates and
family arrangements that merit further careful consideration.
Prosecution of Child Abuse on Federal Lands: A Hole in the
Wall by F. Chris Austin considers the gaps in federal
legislation addressing the problem of child abuse on federal
lands in general, on Indian lands in particular. Mr. Austin
reviews some of the major federal laws designed to motivate
and facilitate local (state and tribal) child abuse prevention and
prosecution, noting that this type of federal child abuse
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legislation is relatively well-developed. He also reviews federal
laws directly prohibiting or authorizing prosecution of child
abuse on federal land, which have focused on child sexual
abuse and often overlooked physical abuse and neglect. There
is no federal law prohibiting nonsexual child abuse on federal
land. Such acts must be prosecuted under state law under the
Assimilative Crimes Act, 21 which does not apply to offense in
Indian country, or must be prosecuted under general assault
provisions of the federal criminal code, which are not made for
child abuse prosecution. Mr. Austin proposes three possible
federal legislative remedies.
The problem of child abuse prevention and punishment has
not been ignored by either the states or by the federal
government. Child abuse legislation has been one of the
"growth areas" of family in both state and federal law for two
decades. Unfortunately, the abuse of children is one of the ugly
byproducts of the breakdown of the family and the evisceration
of other mediating institutions-the communities that foster
and enforce values, such as neighborhood, extended family,
church and ethnic community (including tribe). Ironically,
proposals to increase direct federal responsibility for solving
the problem only exacerbate this problem. Strengthening the
initiative of the federal government, remote from the influence
that cause child abuse, has the effect of weakening the
communities that are closest to the source of the problem and
best situated to deal effectively with it. This short piece does
not consider the dilemma of different cultural definitions of
abuse and neglect (a major concern underlying the enactment
of the Indian Child Welfare Act). 22 It raises serious issues of
federalism and cultural diversity. Mr. Austin's report reminds
us that there are some huge gaps in the national system of
child abuse punishment laws.
IV.

CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FAMILY LAW ISSUES
THAT WILL GREET THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As the papers published herein demonstrate, a wide
variety of issues, policies and problems were addressed at the
North American Regional Conference. But common points can
be discerned. First and foremost, the desire for fairness in the

21
22

18 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1!:JHH).
25 U.S.C. § 1!:!01 (1!:188).

18

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 8

law is an overriding concern. Virtually every reform proposal
and analysis of policy issues explicitly or implicitly, raised
fairness as an underlying consideration. Second, changing
social circumstances were noted in all of the papers. Living in
an age of constant and rapid change clearly is felt and reflected
by these scholars. Third, the value of families and family
relations is either expressed or assumed in all of these papers.
Despite the profound social changes that have occurred and are
occurring, it appears that the family is, in the words of Mary Jo
Bane, "here to stay."23 Fourth, a desire for greater legal
protection of family relations, particularly for those who are
dependent upon and who invest heavily to benefit the family, is
a prominent theme of these papers, as it was throughout the
conference.
One other theme was suggested more by its absence than
by its presence in the papers presented herein, and at the
North American Regional Conference generally. It appears that
conflict-theory ideology and dogmatic, gender-interest-driven
analysis are abating among serious family law scholars.
Gender-based concerns in family law are neither novel nor
insignificant; the connections between gender and family role
are too long-established and well-documented by too many
disciplines to be ignored or dismissed. 24 However, the narrow
advocacy of gender-preferences in legal policy, puts a type of
special class-preference above principle, and raises serious
concerns about fundamental values of individual rights, equal
justice, family integrity, and the rule of law. 25 Likewise,
conflict-based theories of family relations may describe the
dynamics of some forms of family dysfunction and deviance, but
by ignoring the historical experience of functional families they
present a distorted model of family life on which to base laws
and policies. Many modern conflict- and gender-viewpoint
approaches have been myopically reductionist, diminishing
families, family relations, law, and policy not merely to the

23 MARY J. BANE, HERE TO STAY: AMERICAN FAMIUES IN THE 20TH CENTURY
(1976).
24 See Julio C. Caycedo et al., Gernler Roles in the Famil:~, in 1 FAMILY
RESEARCH: A SIXTY-YEAR REVIEW, 1930-1990, at 435-491 (Stephen J. Bahr ed.,
1991).
25 "The too familiar vice of the present age is to obtrude as manifest truths,
mere fancies, born of conjecture and superficial reasoning, altogether unsupported
by the testimony of sense." William Harvey, quoted in DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE
DISCOVERERS 367 (1983).
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sum of the parts (male and female, parent and child) but
centrifugally casting them into adversary male-versus-female,
and parent-versus-child conflict alignments. If the sad
experience of many individuals with family dysfunction and
family breakup proves it is necessary for the law to recognize
the potential for, and address the flare-ups of such conflicts, to
let that vision of the family dominate public policy and
scholarship makes no more sense than to adopt triage or
emergency room medical services as the model for all medical
services. The presentations at the North American Regional
Conference, as represented by the papers published here,
demonstrate that serious family law scholars now generally
value analysis of family law issues from more balanced and
complete perspectives.
Thus, there appears to be a consensus among North
American family law scholars that these five thematic concerns
dominate the analysis of family law and policy at the end of the
Twentieth Century. The opening of the Twenty-first Century
will probably find family law scholars searching for ways to
empower appropriate discretion in family dispute resolution, to
cope with changing social values and family arrangements, to
recognize the hidden value of families and family relations, to
protect those who depend upon and sacrifice to promote the
welfare of individual family units, and to analyze family law
issues from perspectives that go beyond narrow conflict-based
theories or rigidly ideological gender-preference advocacy.

